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Abstract
Many distributed systems that are currently being designed are object based. These
sytems require a model for authentication and access control which conforms to the
object model. They need a model that allows objects to control their own security. In
systems where every object in a security domain can not be trusted, there must also
be a means for enforcing domain-wide security policies. This must be done without
violating the object model.
This paper develops such a security model for the Information Mesh, an infras-
tructure for facilitating information manipulation. It discusses the goals of the Infor-
mation Mesh and previous work that has been done towards developing a server-based
security model. The paper then proposes a security model that allows objects to con-
trol their own security while still providing centralized policy enforcement. Finally,
it presents an example of the model in action.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Modern authentication systems, such as Kerberos [7], are based on a model of a central
policy server that must be queried to obtain permission to access other servers. This
model, while effective, does not conform to the object model being used by many
emerging distributed infrastructures [1, 5, 6]. This work proposes a security model
for one such object-based system, The Information Mesh.
The object model advocates the doctrine that objects manage their own destiny.
Following this model, it is necessary that objects control their own security policy,
hence they can not be forced to accept tickets from a policy server. Clients must ask
each server for permission to use its services. The servers may then choose to query
a policy server for advice, but each server makes that choice on its own.
Such a server-based security model means that there is no longer a centrally-
defined security policy. A security domain's policy is therefore the union of the
policies of all the servers within that domain. If a single server in a domain has a
weak security policy, the domain's policy will also be weak. This observation leads
to a couple of problems with the server-based security model. First, it is necessary
to trust all servers within a security domain to enforce the desired policy. Second,
there can be a consistency problem when changing a domain's security policy. This
problem exists when the the policy change involves many servers. Since every server
needs to be updated individually (unless, of course, they all just defer their decisions
to a central server), the potential for different servers to be enforcing inconsistent
policies is fairly high. This inconsistency could pose a fairly serious security risk.
Neither of these problems exists in a centralized model, since modifying a security
policy only involves updating a single, or small group, of servers. We would like to
have a security model that gives us the advantages of centralized control without
violating the object model. Objects must still be able to control their own destinies
without having to depend upon the decisions of other servers.
This work proposes such a security model for use in the Information Mesh. It
starts with a server-based model and expands it to include some centralized control.
This is accomplished by allowing a group of servers to behave like a single object. The
domain object then may intercept incoming requests and apply its security policy to
them. its policy therefore behaves as a centralized policy to the servers encapsulated
within the domain. The servers within the domain may still enforce their own security
polices.
The model will use a cascaded authentication protocol to allow servers to authen-
ticate requests. The protocol requires servers to provide access certificates for their
services. Every server that handles one of these certificates must add its own signa-
ture to it. This certificate will allow servers to authenticate all the servers that have
handled it.
A demonstration of the model has been built as part of this project. It has been
useful both to demonstrate the validity of the model and as a tool to expose the
many issues and trade-offs that must be considered when implementing the model.
The demonstration implements the security model along with a set of servers that
control the reservation of conference rooms around MIT.
The remainder of this document will describe the model, the demonstration of it,
and the project for which it has been developed. Chapter two will describe the Infor-
mation Mesh project and the environment for which the security model is designed.
Previous work in the area of server-based security models and cascaded authentica-
tion protocols will then be described in chapter three. Chapter four will build upon
this work to describe the theoretical security model being proposed. The demonstra-
tion of the model is described in chapter five along with many of the trade-offs that
must be considered when implementing the model. Finally, chapter six concludes
with results of this work and ideas for future work in developing and implementing
the model.
Chapter 2
The Information Mesh Project
Before we can develop a security model, we must understand the environment in
which it will be used. This is necessary so that the model will provide an appropriate
level of security for the environment and that it will conform to the goals and other
models of the environment.
The Information Mesh project is developing a long-lived infrastructure to facilitate
information access and manipulation. Such a project is necessary for the Internet
to adapt to the tremendous growth it has experienced over the last several years, in
traffic related to information manipulation. Tools currently available for manipulating
information have not been able to keep up with the explosion of information. For
example, services that index the World Wide Web have not been able to index the
information as fast as it is created, nor have they been able to keep pace with changes
in information they have already indexed. The Information Mesh project believes
that the solution requires not only better tools to be developed, but it also requires
an infrastructure that is designed to better handle the vast amount of information
already available and that which will become available.
In order to accomplish this goal, the Information Mesh is developing a substrate
that will provide a uniform representation of objects and their relationships and allows
for manipulation of this information. At the same time, the Mesh should not force
the applications that it supports to all agree on the internal structure of information
and how it is manipulated. It should also provide a layer of abstraction between
the transport protocols and the applications. The project is working on developing
a minimal set of constraints for an infrastructure which can provide the services
necessary for information manipulation without limiting the applications that can
use the information.
Work towards a long-lived information infrastructure has resulted in a Mesh ker-
nel, a Mesh object system, and Mesh links. The Mesh kernel provides a library of
service routines that provide support for object identification and information repre-
sentation and location. Using the concept of roles to describe the nature of objects,
the Mesh object system provides flexible and evolvable objects for the Information
Mesh. Mesh links provide a mechanism to express the relationships between Mesh
objects.
This chapter describes the goals and requirements necessary for achieving the
visions of the Information Mesh. It also describes the Mesh object system and links.
2.1 Goals
It is necessary to understand the goals of the Information Mesh in order to fully un-
derstand its design. Its goals can be summarized as: universality, longevity, mobility,
evolution, resiliency, homogeneity, and heterogeneity.
* Universality
The Information Mesh should provide a single model of information identifi-
cation and location for "network-based applications accessing information that
is distributed both physically throughout the net and administratively across
regions of differing management policies [151."
* Longevity
The Information Mesh must be able to support long-lived information. Infor-
mation and references to the information should be able to survive over long
periods of time (greater than 100 years). It must be able to support any format
the information may take over that time since we can not expect all information
to be reformatted to adapt to changing technologies.
* Mobility
Information will move over time to new physical locations as well as new ad-
ministrative locations. References to the information must remain valid despite
these changes.
* Evolution
The Information Mesh must be able to adapt as layers above and below it
evolve. This means the Mesh must be able to support changing semantics,
syntax, structures, and utilization of information as well as supporting new
types of information and relationships. The Mesh must also be able to take
advantage of changes in protocols and networks.
* Resiliency
Unreliability is unavoidable in a large network. There are any number of reasons
why a piece of information may be unavailable when needed. The Information
Mesh should be designed to handle such failures gracefully.
* Homogeneity
In order for distinct applications and information to interact well, it is nec-
essary for the Information Mesh to "provide a single model for information
identification, location, and access, as a substrate for distributed systems and
applications [15]." This provides a stable abstraction barrier that can allow
increased functionality only when it is desired.
* Heterogeneity
The Information Mesh should be flexible enough to provide support in a diverse
environment. It should be able to take advantage of current and future network
services as well as provide support for a highly varied set of expectations from
applications and administrative controls.
These goals may be expressed by two implementation requirements: minimality
and flexibility. Since the Information Mesh is designed to support such a diverse and
changing set of applications and network support, it must place as few restrictions on
its users as possible. In order to accomplish this, it should provide only the minimum
necessary to support the goals described above and only require the minimum coordi-
nation and agreement necessary to meet the goals. This is important because "we can
not depend on any universal agreement on issues like a best way to find information,
the internal structure of information or how information is internally manipulated by
programs [18]."
The Information Mesh must be highly flexible to adapt to a diverse and ever
changing environment. It must be able to support changing information, network
infrastructures, expectations from applications, protocols, and whatever else may
change in the future. Without such great flexibility, the Information Mesh will not
be able to achieve its goals.
2.2 Naming
Naming things is an important way that the Information Mesh achieves its goals. It
is also crucial since the security model must be able to identify objects and principals.
Naming generally is used to provide three functions: identification, access, and
description. To help support longevity, mobility, and evolution, the Information Mesh
has separated these three functions. This is similar to work that's been done in the
Uniform Resource Identifiers working group of the IETF [8, 14, 2]. Every object
is assigned an oid (object identifier) which uniquely identifies the object through
both space and time. This is similar to the URI working group's URN (Uniform
Resource Name). Using the IETF's terminology, Uniform Resource Locators (URL)
will provide the location functionality and Uniform Resource Characteristics (URC)
will provide the meta-information. The Information Mesh takes advantage of one
type of meta-information, called hints, to help translate oids to URLs.
2.3 Object Model
The Information Mesh object system [17] provides a typing model for objects that
allows for the flexibility and evolution that is necessary to achieve the Mesh's goals.
It is also designed to work in an environment where the enforcement of the typing is
not guaranteed.
Object behavior is based on the concept of a role which all objects must play. A
role describes an abstract structure and behavior. If an object behaves in the manner
described by a role, then the object plays that role. An object may play several
different roles and which roles it plays may change over time. To illustrate these
concepts, imagine an individual who plays many roles over a lifetime such as a child,
teenager, student, parent, friend, etc.
All objects must play the object-role. The object-role is the root for an inheritance
hierarchy such that an object plays all of a role's super roles in addition to playing a
particular role. All objects that play the object-role (and therefore all Mesh objects)
are required to be able to answer questions about what roles they play, describe the
implementation objects for those roles, and allow the addition of new roles.
The remainder of this section will describe roles in greater detail. It will also
describe implementations which give objects the ability to play a role by providing a
concrete representation of the role.
2.3.1 Roles
Roles are composed of three aspects: actions, parts, and makers. Actions describe
the abstract functionality of the role, parts describe the abstract structures of an
object that plays the role, and makers define the abstract functions used to create
objects that play the role. Each aspect may have some required components and
some optional components. All implementations of the role must provide the required
aspects, while they may only provide a subset of the optional ones.
As mentioned above, roles inherit actions, parts, and makers from their super roles.
This gives roles the ability to provide an extensible typing mechanism by inserting
new roles into the hierarchy. This extensibility, along with an object's ability to play
multiple and evolving roles, give roles the flexibility and evolvability necessary to
meet the goals of the Information Mesh.
Roles are first class objects which play the role-role. Objects that play the role-
role support the actions, parts, and makers necessary to play a role. Since roles are
objects, they must also play the object role and support the required actions of an
object.
2.3.2 Implementations
Implementations provide Mesh objects with concrete representations of a role's ac-
tions, parts, and makers. This gives the object the ability to play that role. An object
may use any implementation of the role it is trying to play.
Implementations have an inheritance mechanism that allows an implementation
to use a description of a concrete role capability from a super implementation if it
does not have its own description. Implementations are also first class Mesh objects
which contain concrete methods for actions, parts, and makers.
2.4 Mesh Links
Mesh links [16, 15] give us the means to express relationships between Mesh objects.
The discussion here will be brief since they do not relate to the security model.
Mesh links provide two features for expressing relationships. The first is a generic
link-role. The generic link is an unordered, unnamed set of endpoints which refer
to objects. Capabilities such as grouping and distinguishing endpoints, expressing
directional links, limiting the number of links, or other functionality can be expressed
by adding subroles to the link-role. This makes the linking model highly flexible and
extensible. The second feature is the ability to express composition in Mesh objects.
By adding an optional get-required-objects action to the object-role, an object can
indicate other objects that must be included to make the object complete.
Chapter 3
Previous Work
This section describes the two ideas that form the foundation of the Information Mesh
security model. The first is a cascaded authentication protocol, developed by Sollins
[13], that is used as the basic means of authentication. Cascaded authentication is
also used in the server-based model proposed by Bull, Gong, and Sollins [3] which is
the second work that forms the base for the Information Mesh's model. This model
has been incorporated into the security framework for the ANSA project [1].
3.1 Cascaded Authentication
Cascaded authentication [13] was developed for use in an environment where cooper-
ation must exist despite the absence of complete trust. A request for a service may
require the invocation to be cascaded in order to fulfill it. That is, the server may
invoke another server which will, in turn, invoke a third server and so on as necessary.
The cascaded authentication protocol allows any server in the chain to authenticate
all the servers that have previously serviced the request and it can put constraints
upon the future progress of the request.
Examples of cascaded requests can be found throughout life. One example is
the signing of a legal document by multiple parties. When an agreement is reached
between multiple parties, one of the parties' lawyers will draft the agreement. He
must sign the document and send it to the lawyers of the other parties involved in
the agreement. Once all the lawyers have signed, it may then be sent to the judge,
who is presiding over the agreement, for his signature. He will not sign the agreement
until all the involved parties have signed. Once he has signed the agreement he must
then pass it back to all the parties so they know that it has been signed. There must
be a means for all the parties to confirm that the appropriate people have signed
the agreement. In this example, the confirmation is accomplished by signatures on
a piece of paper. Cascaded authentication gives us a means of providing this sort of
confirmation digitally.
3.1.1 Access Certificates
The tool needed to enable the authentication is an access certificate1. This
certificate is signed by every server that handles it. The servers may also add their
own constraints to the certificate when they sign it. The certificate allows any server
to verify the servers who have handled the certificate and their constraints.
Constraints limit the future progress and the results of a service request. They
can limit many different aspects of a request. For example, it could limit the number
of servers that may handle the request. They may also limit the amount of money,
or other resources, that servicing the request may consume. The principals allowed
to handle the request may also be controlled.
When signing a certificate, each server must include several pieces of information
in order to verify the certificate's authenticity. First, it must encrypt the ciphertext
part of the certificate it received along with the name of the server to which it will be
passed next and the constraints that it is adding to the certificate. It then adds its
own name and constraints to the cleartext portion of the certificate. The combination
of the cleartext and encrypted information allows the authentication server to verify
that no one has tampered with the access certificate.
A nonce is included in the initial access certificate to add randomness to the en-
crypted information. The randomness is necessary to guard against a known cleartext
1The access certificate is called a passport in Sollins' work [13].
attack. Without the randomness, such an attack is possible since all the encrypted
information is also made available in the clear.
Sallins' work assumes a secret key encryption scheme for her protocols, though
she notes that it could be easily converted to a public key scheme as demonstrated
by Needham and Schroeder [11]. The encryption should be chained' so it is possible
to add some randomness to the encryption. The trade-offs between secret and public
key cryptography will be discussed later in the context of the security model.
Using the following notation, we can illustrate the form of an access certificate:
{}K The material within the brackets is encrypted with key, K.
A, B, D, E names of principals
IA1  the i'th nonce unique to principal A
KA principle A's secret key, known only to A and the authentication server
CA the constraints included by A
In this example, A creates a certificate to hand off to B who turns around and
passes it on to D. If D were to then hand it off to E, D would have to sign it in the
same way B signed it. First, A will create an initial access certificate to send to B that
has the form:
{IA,, B, CAKA , A, CA
If B then wants to pass the certificate to D, then it must sign the certificate and
add the appropriate cleartext information:
{{IA,, B, CA}KA, D, CB}KB, A, CA, B, CB
3.1.2 Pairwise Authentication
A pairwise authentication protocol is used to transport the access certificate between
two servers. While it is only necessary for a server to authenticate the server from
which it receives a certificate, pairwise authentication has several important advan-
tages. Pairwise authentication is needed to detect collusion between two servers.
2DES's Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, for example.
Also, the added authentication it provides can reduce the amount of verification that
would be needed if the authentication were only one-sided.
Sollins suggests using a pairwise authentication scheme similar to one suggested by
Needham and Schroeder [11]. This scheme first requires an exchange with a trusted
authentication server3 to obtain a conversation key which will be used for the pairwise
authentication.
The following notation (in addition to the notation above) will be used to illus-
trate the protocol for getting a conversation key. A is requesting a key from the
authentication server to enable it to communicate with B. The arrows indicate the
direction the message moves, while time moves down the page.
T a time stamp
CK a conversation key
AS the authentication server
A AS
B, IAj
{IE ( ,B, CK, T, {CK, T, A) K KA
Figure 3-1: Getting a Conversation Key
The first message contains no secret information, so it doesn't need to be en-
crypted. It contains the name of the server with which A would like to communicate
and a nonce that is used as a challenge to the authentication server. The authen-
tication server responds by returning this information along with the conversation
key, a time stamp that indicates when the key expires, and a ticket encrypted with
B's secret key. This information is all encrypted with A's secret key. A can be sure
3This may actually require more than one authentication server. The servers must at least trust
authentications servers that either trust each other or are part of a single chain of authentication
servers that trust each other.
that this response is from the authentication server because KA is only known to the
authentication server and A, so only the authentication server could correctly encrypt
IA*. The ticket is used by B to get CK, the timestamp, and the identity of A. It can
verify that these came from the authentication server because KB is only known to
the authentication server and B.
The conversation key can be used as many times as necessary until it expires.
This eliminates the need to access the authentication server every time a new pairwise
authentication is about to start. If the key is compromised, though, it will expire so
the integrity of the system will be maintained. Requests to the authentication server
may be batched as another way to improve efficiency.
Once A has acquired a ticket and a conversation key, A and B can authenticate
each other:
A B
{CK, T, A) KB, (I Ak CK
(IAk -1, I Bi ) CK
CK
{IBi -1) ,data
reply
Figure 3-2: Pairwise Authentication
The pairwise authentication starts when A sends the ticket and a nonce encrypted
with the conversation key to B. B then can decrypt the ticket, revealing CK and veri-
fying the ticket should have come from A. B also learns when CK expires. B can then
use CK to decrypt the nonce. B encrypts and returns a decremented IAk and its own
nonce to A. At this point, A can be sure that B is authentic since only B could have
gotten CK from the ticket and used it to decrypt IAk. A similarly responds to B's
challenge by returning a decremented and encrypted version of Is,. A can also send
its data with message three because it is convinced of B's identity. B then replies in
the fourth message. The data and reply may also be encrypted with the conversation
key to assure that no one has tampered with them.
3.2 Server-based Security
The Information Mesh's security policy is based on the server-based security model
that was developed by Bull, Gong, and Sollins [3]. This model proposed that servers
control their own security policies. It uses a modified version of the cascaded authen-
tication protocols discussed above. This section first discusses the motivation for a
server-based security model, then describes the relevent features of the model.
3.2.1 Motivation
One of the major contributions of Bull, Gong, and Sollins [3] is that they describe
the advantages of a server-based security model over an infrastructure-based model.
These arguments are important to understanding why a security model for the Infor-
mation Mesh should be built on a server-based model.
One of the major arguments for a server-based model is that it is a natural model
to use in an object-based system. A fundamental characteristic of objects is "you
don't manage objects, objects manage themselves" [3]. So naturally, objects should
control their own security policies otherwise there would be a foreign influence over
the management of the objects.
Reducing the granularity of the security policy (from security domains to servers)
by giving servers control of their own policies has several positive effects. It allows for
immediate revocation of access privileges since access is not granted until the service
is requested 4. Since the servers control their own policies, they are modular so they
can migrate from system to system or be included in new systems without updating
a central policy server. It also means that server-specific parts of a server's security
policy can be built into its design.
A final advantage is the wide range of security policies that it is possible to im-
4This can be contrasted to an infrastructure-based model, like Kerberos [7], where access is
granted at the time the Kerberos server issues a ticket, not when the service is requested.
plement when the granularity of policy enforcement is the server. Each server can
enforce a wide range of policies from being open to everyone to being limited to just
a few trusted servers. They also have the ability to enforce their policies on every
client or server that has handled the request, not just the client that requested the
service. Such flexibility on a server-by-server basis can lead to a very complex set of
policies which can both be useful and problematic. The complexity may be difficult
to manage on a system-wide basis, since the sum of all the servers' policies character-
izes the system's security policy. To solve this, it may be useful to have the servers'
default policies set to request help from a central policy server. This still fits the
model because it is the server that is choosing to ask the policy server for assistance
and not the infrastructure imposing the policy on the server.
A human user would fit into an object-based model quite well. The user would
be represented as an object the same as a server. The user would then be in control
of her own security policy as she would expect.
3.2.2 Realization
The paper also discusses several design issues for a server-based security model. In
order to avoid getting bogged down in unnecessary details, this section only discusses
the issues that will be relevent for the design of the Information Mesh's security
model.
There are several features of the server-based model that will be used:
* The model assumes that the infrastructure enforces strong encapsulation of
objects so that the only access to an object is through its advertised interface.
This prevents any access to an object through a "backdoor."
* Each server in this model is an object which has control over its own security
policy, even if its policy is to defer the decision to a policy server. The decision
about whether or not a service will be granted occurs at the time the service is
requested.
* A server will create an access certificate for its service. This certificate must
be presented by a client for the service to be granted. These initial certificates
may be signed by a key known only to the server because it will only need to
be decrypted once it returns to the server.
* Access certificates will be passed by some method of cascaded authentication.
This will be discussed further below.
* A trusted authentication server is needed to aid in the decryption and verifica-
tion of access certificates.
* A server that advertises and distributes access certificates will likely be a part of
a server-based system. While it will not be part of the demonstration presented
in this work, it would be a useful server to implement.
Bull, Gong, and Sollins suggest a different means of cascaded authentication than
described above. While it has many similarities, it differs in three fundamental ways.
First, it uses one-way hash functions to sign the certificates instead of encryption.
Second, it doesn't include any mechanism for including constraints. Finally, it does
not include a pairwise authentication mechanism. The lack of the constraints and
pairwise authentication mechanisms are the main reasons that this method of cas-
caded authentication was not used in the Information Mesh's security model.
Chapter 4
The Security Model
While a security model is not part of the core services provided by the Information
Mesh, it is necessary for an operational system. It is also needed to help identify and
design any core services necessary to support a security system. This model provides
integrity, authenticity, and access control, but does not specifically provide privacy.
The Mesh security model is based upon the server-based model and the cascaded
authentication protocols described in the previous chapter. The Mesh security model
generalizes the server-based model to add flexibility and allow some centralized control
without giving up the advantages of allowing servers to control their own security.
This is accomplished by allowing a collection of servers to be encapsulated as an
object in addition to each server being an object. This model allows us to impose
a centralized policy as well as having each server control its own destiny without
violating the object model that was important to the success of the server-based
model. We have essentially generalized the server-based model to an object-based
model.
The Mesh's object-based security model provides the advantages of the server-
based model, but corrects some of its weaknesses by using some of the features of
a centralized model. A cascaded authentication scheme similar to the one described
in Section 3.1 will be used to take advantage of the power of constraints and the
additional security provided by pairwise authentication.
The remainder of this chapter will provide a high-level description of the Mesh's
object-based security model. An implementation of the model will be discussed in
Chapter 5. This chapter will discuss a threat model for the Information Mesh envi-
ronment, weaknesses of the server-based model, the Mesh's object-based model, and
a generic server that describes all servers conforming to the model.
4.1 Requirements for Security
It is important to understand what problems the Mesh security model is attempting
to solve before we propose the model. It is necessary to look at the environment and
what threats may be attempted. It is also necessary to look at the weaknesses of the
server-based model to understand what improvements we are trying to achieve. We
must also understand the model's weaknesses and what problems it does not attempt
to solve. We will then not be tempted to apply the model to a problem which it can
not solve.
We will now look at the our threat model and the weaknesses of the server-based
model.
4.1.1 Threat Model
We must understand what kinds of attacks may be made to our system before we
can build up guards against them. In order to do this, we must look at what kinds
of attacks may be mounted against servers in the Information Mesh environment and
determine which ones we will and will not attempt to guard against. Voydock and
Kent [19] provide a good overview of possible threats and will be used as the basis of
this discussion.
The Information Mesh depends upon an environment where communication occurs
over local and wide area networks. These networks consist of hosts interconnected by
links'. For this discussion, we will assume that end hosts are secure, but the links are
not. It is possible for an intruder to tap into the link and read and send data over it.
'Note that these are hardware links such as Ethernet, phone lines, and radio and should not be
confused with Mesh links discussed earlier.
The intruder may also compromise a gateway or server within the network.
This environment leaves the Mesh open to both passive and active attacks. Passive
attacks can only result in releasing information to unauthorized principals, while
active attacks may change what information is sent or may prevent the information
from making it to its destination. We will now look at the particular attacks that
may be attempted in our environment and if the Information Mesh's security model
will try to prevent the attacks.
Passive Attacks:
* Release of Message Contents. It is necessary to provide a mechanism to main-
tain the privacy of data that is transmitted by the Information Mesh. This
is accomplished by using an encryption scheme that ensures privacy such as
the chain encryption scheme that is found in DES CBC-mode. While it is not
necessary to encrypt all data that is transmitted, it is important to leave such
an option available.
* Traffic Analysis. Traffic analysis is a transport-level threat that is not guarded
against in our model. The Information Mesh security model is only designed to
secure high-level protocols and, therefore, does not provide any mechanisms to
guard against any transport-level threats.
Active Attacks:
* Message Integrity. Message integrity refers to detecting modifications to trans-
mitted messages. This can be accomplished by encrypting known or redundant
information to allow a high probability of detecting any modifications. This
will be discussed in Section 4.3.
* Message Authenticity. Attacks on message authenticity include sending mes-
sages that are created by an intruder trying to use a false identity and replaying
messages that have previously been sent. The cascaded authentication protocols
in Section 4.3 are designed to guard against these types of attacks.
* Message Ordering. The Information Mesh security model does not provide any
mechanisms for detecting attacks that attempt to change the ordering of the
messages transmitted.
* Denial of Service. We do not provide any mechanisms for detecting or prevent-
ing a denial of service attack and leave it up to the user to recognize such an
attack.
Voydock and Kent provide full descriptions of these attacks and discuss methods
of guarding against them.
4.1.2 Weaknesses of Server-based Model
We must examine the weaknesses of the server-based model in order to illustrate the
problems that we are attempting to solve. Since the Mesh security model is built
upon the server-based model, we are able to use the security features that it provides
and must only correct its weaknesses. We also must be careful not to introduce any
new weaknesses in the process of expanding the model.
We have seen that the server-based model (Section 3.2) has two forms of weak-
nesses - those that can be corrected by using different protocols and those that are
fundamental to the model. Weaknesses in the cascaded authentication protocols of
the server-based model will be reviewed here, along with the Mesh security model's
solution to them. The fundamental problems with the model will be discussed here,
though the solutions to them will be discussed in the next section.
As previously discussed, the server-based model did not use a pairwise authenti-
cation scheme. This left it open to attack by two or more servers working together
to fool a server later in the invocation chain. This collusion will be prevented by us-
ing a modified version of the cascaded authentication scheme that will be presented
in Section 4.3. These modified protocols are based on the cascaded authentication
scheme of Section 3.1. These protocols also have the advantage of using constraints
to limit progress of a request beyond specified bounds.
The server-based model has other weaknesses that are more fundamental to the
model. They result from the fine granularity of the security policy achieved by the
model. Since the effective security policy for a collection of servers is the union of the
servers' individual policies, an untrustworthy server may cause a discrepancy to form
between the desired and effective policies for that group. A server may be uninten-
tionally untrustworthy if it has a weak security policy or is poorly implemented or it
may be purposefully untrustworthy - actively attempting to damage the security of
the security domain. Any untrustworthy server will cause a weakness 2 in the effec-
tive policy of the domain, though the weakness will be limited to that untrustworthy
server.
The fine granularity of the server-based model may also have problems when a
desired policy change affects many servers in the security domain. As the servers are
updated, there may be inconsistencies in their policies if some have been updated and
others have not. This inconsistency could leave a weakness that leaves the domain
open to attack. Additionally, all the servers that are affected by the change must
have their policies updated. This could be a large and difficult task for changes that
affect many servers.
These are not problems in a centralized system where all policy decisions are made
by a single server3 . Since all service providers must submit to the centralized policy,
untrustworthy servers can not enforce incorrect policies. Furthermore inconsistent
policies are not a problem since the update is only made in one place.
Centralized authentication systems, such as Kerberos, may experience other in-
consistencies when modifying security policies. They often do not have a mechanism
to revoke access privileges for a service immediately. Kerberos, for example, issues a
principal a ticket for a service. This ticket is good until it expires, even if the security
policy changes to exclude that principal in the meantime. The server-based security
model, on the other hand, allows for immediate revocation of access privileges.
2Here we are considering a weakness to be a deviation from the desired security policy. If the
desired policy has weaknesses, then it is a problem with the policy and not the servers.
3The centralized system may distribute the policy over several policy servers that act as one.
These servers still impose a policy on service providers so, despite having a distributed security
policy, it should not be confused with the server-based model.
We would, therefore, like to impose some centralized control on the server-based
model. This must be accomplished without sacrificing the advantages of the au-
tonomous model. The next section will describe such a solution that will be used as
the Information Mesh's security model.
4.2 Security Domains as Objects
The Information Mesh's security model overlays the server-based model with some
centralized control. The centralized control does not violate the object model that is
crucial for the success of the server-based model. This is accomplished by allowing
groups of servers to be modeled as a single domain object.
The domain object controls its own security policy, as all objects do in the server-
based model. This allows an administrator to encapsulate a set of servers with a
domain object and set the policy of the domain object. The domain object intercepts
any messages that are destined for servers which it encapsulates. It then applies its
security policy to the request and passes it on to its destination if it passes the security
check. The message may then be intercepted by successive domains until it reaches
its destination or it fails to pass one of the domain's security policies. Therefore, a
domain object's security policy represents a centralized policy imposed on the set of
servers it encapsulates.
The domain object may encapsulate a group of one or more servers, domain ob-
jects, or a combination of both. This flexibility permits many possible domain for-
mations. At one extreme, the server-based model is the special case where a set of
servers is not part of a domain object (Figure 4-1.A). Other configurations include
a full hierarchy of domains (Figure 4-1.B), overlapping domains (Figure 4-1.C), do-
mains that contain both other domains and servers (Figure 4-1.D), and any other
combination one would like to create.
Domains may be added or removed without the "victim" servers knowing about
the change. The servers do not know that any centralized control is being placed
on messages sent to them since all they see is an incoming message that follows the
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Figure 4-1: A Few Configurations of Six Servers in the Object-based Model. En-
closed areas represent objects. Unlabeled objects are domains. (A) Servers with no
domains, equivalent to server-based model; (B) A hierarchical nesting of domains; (C)
overlapping domains; and (D) domain that contains both other domain and servers.
same protocols whether coming directly from the requesting server or having been
filtered through several domains. The server will only receive messages that have
been approved by all the domains that surround it.
The activities, basically the enforcement of the security policy, of a domain is
controlled by a domain server. The domain server is simply a generic server (as
described below) that approves or rejects a request based on its domain's policy. How
it shows approval or disapproval may vary between implementations (see Section 5.3).
The domain server must be trusted to implement the desired security policy and to
perform correctly.
Two questions about domains must be explored in more detail. First, we must de-
termine how to make a group of computers, possibly located over a wide geographical
area, behave as a single object. This question can be refined to ask how do we redirect
messages to the appropriate domain server so it can be intercepted before it reaches
its destination. Second, even with appropriate redirection of messages, there can be
difficulties enforcing domain policies on some intradomain and possibly interdomain
messages.
4.2.1 Navigating the Domains
The description of domains above assumes that there is a mechanism that enables a
domain server to intercept messages. Such a mechanism would allow domains to be
added and removed without affecting the operation of servers inside or outside the
domain. Ideally, this would be accomplished by providing a secure mechanism for
the domain server to specify, at the IP routing level, that network traffic destined
for a particular server must be routed through the domain. Unfortunately, no such
mechanism currently exists. This section offers some alternative mechanisms and
their weaknesses.
In order to simplify our discussion, we will introduce a new term, the path. A path
is a list of domains through which a request must travel in order to reach the particular
server that can process the request. We will impose an ordering on the domains in a
path from most general to most specific. A domain is more general than another if
it completely encapsulates the other domain. Two domains that overlap, but neither
completely encapsulates the other, are considered equal in terms of generality. This
ordering can be necessary for enforcing security policies as we will see in Section 5.3.
The solution involves a second trusted server, the path server. A path server
provides mappings between a server and its path. Adding and removing domains are
done by informing the path server of the change. The path server then must update
all its paths to reflect the change. The server also has the responsibility of making
sure all the domain servers in a path have approved a request before it is passed on
to the destination server.
Our problem of redirection is now reduced to having to redirect the requests to
the path server so it can then direct the message through the correct path. If all the
servers in a domain, or in a set of domains, are in a single geographical area and can
all be placed behind a gateway, then the solution is simple - the gateway can redirect
the messages to the path server.
Not all domains may have the geographic locality necessary to use gateway to
redirect messages. There are several possible ways to solve this problem, though they
all have some weaknesses. The first would be to use the Domain Name Service (DNS)
[9, 10] to map server (host) names to the path server instead of to the actual host.
This has some flaws. First, it depends upon the security of DNS. DNS security is not
a safe assumption and has been a problem when implementing security managers for
Java [4]. Second, it can not guard against an attacker who knows the IP address and
port number of the destination server and can therefore bypass DNS.
Another way to handle this is to designate false ports on each host. These false
ports would be advertised as the well known ports for servers. Any messages sent to
these ports would be redirected to a path server who knows the real port to send the
message. This is obviously flawed if the attacker knows the actual port for the server
and sends messages directly to it.
Finally, two options involve putting trust in the servers to do the right thing. The
first option would be to trust all the servers within a domain to make sure all requests
have travelled the correct path. If they have not, the servers should send the requests
to a path server in order to assure that they have traveled the appropriate path. This
requires that we trust all the servers to behave correctly, which we were trying to
avoid, so it is a useless solution. The second solution requires us to trust all servers
outside the domain to send requests to the path server. This is obviously a problem
because it forces a domain to trust the servers against which it is trying to protect
itself.
This problem of redirecting messages is not solved here and is an issue for future
research. The solution will likely involve manipulating routing protocols, as described
at the beginning of this section. Since this work only describes a demonstration of the
security model where we can control aspects of the environment, we trust all servers
to send requests to a path server instead of the servers for which they are destined.
4.2.2 Local Message Problems
A second problem can arise when passing requests between two servers on the same
local area network (LAN) or even on the same host. If a request is passed between
the two servers it may be impossible to redirect the message before it is read by the
destination server. This may not be a problem if all the servers on the same host or
LAN are in the same domain. In this case, we can declare that the domains may only
apply their security policies to requests originating outside the domain. The servers
still control their own policies and will provide security for intradomain requests.
We can not completely pass the problem off that easily. What if a domain needs to
apply some restrictions on intradomain messages? Or what if multiple domains exist
on a single LAN or host? We need some way of redirecting these messages to a path
server. Many of the flawed options above will also work to solve this problem. The
option of trusting all servers to send their requests to a path server will "solve" this
problem as it did above. Since we can control the environment of the demonstration,
the trust is a reasonable assumption.
4.3 Cascaded Authentication
Cascaded authentication is needed to provide authentication for cascaded invocations.
The Mesh security model uses a version of cascaded authentication very similar to the
one presented in Section 3.1. This section describes modifications to the protocols that
are necessary for the security model. This section also describes a third trusted server
that is required by the model - the authentication server. Efficiency considerations
with the protocol are also discussed. The section concludes with a discussion of the
trade-offs between using public and private key encryption schemes for the protocol.
We also must take a very brief look at the representation of constraints. Con-
straints are information that may be added to an access certificate to limit future
invocations on behalf of the associated request. They can be implemented in a simi-
lar manner to the security policy described in Section 5.2.4. We will use this abstract
concept of a constraint until that discussion.
4.3.1 Modifications
The Information Mesh's security model makes several minor modifications to the cas-
caded authentication protocols described in Section 3.1. Beyond the modifications
described here, all other aspects of the protocol remain the same. One modifica-
tion results from communication with authentication servers, while the others are
modifications to the access certificate.
The first modification occurs when a server performs a pairwise authentication
with an authentication server. It is not necessary for the server to obtain a conver-
sation key because it already shares a secret key, KA, with the authentication server.
The pairwise authentication protocol can be modified to use this key:
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Figure 4-2: Pairwise Authentication with an Authentication Server
These changes do not affect the protocol very much. The first message of the
protocol no longer needs the ticket since it was used to pass the conversation key to
B and assure B that the ticket came from the authentication server. For the rest of
the protocol, KA replaces CK as the conversation key. KA is known only to A and
the authentication server so it behaves the same as CK. A problem arises when the
key is compromised. A can no longer depend upon the conversation key to expire and
will have to arrange a new shared key with the authentication server.
This problem with a broken conversation key may be compounded by the concern
that a key is more likely to be broken if it is used more often. This suggests that we
may desire different modifications to the protocol. This modification would involve
leaving the ticket out of both the original pairwise authentication protocol and the
protocol for getting a new conversation key. The ticket's purpose was to prove to
a third party (B in Figures 3-1 and 3-2) that the conversation key came from the
authentication server. There is no third party when communicating with an authen-
tication server so the ticket is not needed. Therefore, a server that would like to
communicate with the authentication server would use these modified protocols to
get a conversation key from the authentication server and use the key to perform a
pairwise authentication with it.
The data in the protocols contains two pieces of information. First it has the
access certificate that is required to access the service. Second, it contains service-
specific information. We will describe examples of service-specific information in the
discussion of particular servers in Chapter 5.
We should note that we often want to be assured the data and reply are also
authentic. If privacy is not an issue, we can accomplish this by encrypting the MD5
[12] of the information with the conversation key. This then can be used as proof
of the information's authenticity. If privacy is an issue, though, we can just encrypt
the information with the conversation key. This guarantees that an attacker has not
tampered with the data or reply. Without one of these protections, an attacker
could modify the unprotected data or reply and gain unauthorized access.
The remaining changes to the protocol involve minor modifications to the access
certificate. The first was suggested as part of the protocol for the server-based model
[3]. It was noted that access certificates often start and end at the same server. This
allows the initial certificate to be signed using a secret key that is known only to
that server for additional security. The initial access certificates in the Mesh security
model will be signed using secret keys that are known only to the creators of the
certificates.
The second modification to the access certificate results from a need to identify
which service the access certificate is requesting. Every server will support several
services, so it will need to supply access certificates for each service. When it receives
a request, it would like to be able to identify which for service the access certificate
was created. This could be accomplished by having a different secret key for each
service. The client would tell the server which service it was requesting and the
server could confirm it by using the appropriate key to decrypt the certificate. We
have opted for another solution that involves adding the name of the service inside
the encrypted part of the initial access certificate and placing it at the beginning of
the cleartext part of the certificate. The server can immediately see which service is
being requested by looking at the cleartext portion of the certificate and this can be
confirmed by checking with the service encrypted in the initial certificate.
We need to add the following to our established notation:
SKA a secret key known only to A
the name of a service provided by A
We can now see the access certificate used by the Mesh:
{IA,, B, CA, S}SKA, S, A, CA
Successive signing of the certificate remains the same as before.
4.3.2 Authentication Server
The authentication server is the third trusted server required by the Mesh security
model. An authentication server will service a defined group of servers. How this
division is made is very flexible. There may be an authentication server per domain
for medium-sized domains, one authentication server for many small domains, or
many authentication servers within a large domain. The job of an authentication
server may also be distributed over several servers.
Each authentication server stores keys for every server it assists. It must be able
to generate and distribute conversation keys when requested. Finally, it will decrypt
access certificates upon request and verify their validity. In order to support de-
crypting certificates that have passed through areas serviced by other authentication
servers, each authentication server must share a key with all authentication servers
that it trusts. Such a key would have to be pre-negotiated between the servers'
administrators as must be done in a Kerberos system.
4.3.3 Efficiency
There are several efficiency issues concerning authentication. One issue, using a
private or public key cryptosystem will be discussed in the next subsection. We
would like to keep the overhead incurred by the authentication to a minimum and be
able to incur little overhead when authentication is not required.
There are several features of the protocol that are included for efficiency reasons.
The timestamp associated with conversation keys allow them to be reused to save
communication with the authentication server. By adjusting the expiration time on
the conversation key, the number of messages necessary for pairwise authentication
can be brought arbitrarily close to four. The modifications to the pairwise authenti-
cation protocol discussed above were also made to improve efficiency.
Batching requests to the authentication server, or any other server, will reduce
the number of network accesses. It also saves on the number of encryptions and
decryptions necessary to process the requests which saves time and computational
resources. In the example presented in Chapter 5, we will see this idea used when
requesting multiple access certificates at the same time.
It is also necessary to minimize the overhead for requests that do not require
any authentication. These requests still need to traverse the entire path dictated
by the path server, but they can avoid the pairwise authentication and the access
certificates which account for much of the overhead. These requests may be done
through a different interface than requests requiring authentication. When a server
receives such a request, it must check its security policy to see if the request needs
authentication. If it does, the request must be denied, even if it is from a principal
that has access to the service, since there is no means to authenticate the request. If
it does not require authentication, then the request may be granted. This is not a
required addition to the security model, but is desired for efficiency.
4.3.4 Private vs. Public Keys
All the protocols discussed so far have assumed the use of a private key encryption
scheme. The protocols are easily converted to use a public key encryption scheme as
demonstrated by Needham and Schroeder [11]. While the Information Mesh security
model does not, and should not, specify which encryption scheme should be used4,
it is important to look at the trade-offs between the two schemes. This section only
discusses the trade-offs in terms of the effect the schemes have on the speed of the
authentication protocols. There are other factors to consider when choosing a method
4Specifying a single encryption scheme would violate the goals of the Information Mesh. Besides,
over a hundred years, new encryption schemes may be realized and the trade-offs discussed here may
change.
of encryption.
The cascaded authentication scheme requires many encryptions and decryptions,
both for the pairwise authentication and the access certificate. This indicates that
the speed of the encryption algorithm will have a significant effect on the speed of the
authentication, especially when processing a request involves a cascaded invocation.
In general, private key encryption schemes have faster implementations than public
key schemes, so the speed of encryption is an advantage for private key schemes.
A close look at decrypting access certificates, though, exposes a potential for
parallel access to keys when using a public key encryption scheme. When decrypting
an access certificate to check its authenticity, each signature must be stripped off
one at a time. If all the keys needed to decrypt the access certificate are stored
on the same authentication server, then the time needed to decrypt it is limited by
the encryption scheme. If the keys are located on different authentication servers,
though, many network accesses will be required. This will affect the speed of the
authentication. Using a private key scheme, the access certificate must be passed to
each authentication server in turn to decrypt the layers for which it has keys. Using
a public key scheme, though, enables the authentication server to request all the keys
in parallel and can then decrypt the access certificate as the keys are returned.
Therefore, the overall speed of a public or private key encryption scheme depends
upon the locality of the servers signing the access certificate. If the common case will
be that most access certificates will only be signed by servers with keys on the local
authentication server, then a private key scheme will be faster, otherwise a public key
scheme may be faster.
4.4 The Generic Server
As a result of this security model, all servers will share a common interface. This
allows us to create a generic server. In terms of the Mesh object system, we can
create a generic-server-role. All servers must play the generic-server-role or one of its
subroles. This section will briefly describe what actions a generic server must be able
to support, while implementation considerations will be discussed in Chapter 5.
The generic server must be able to support a cascaded authentication interface.
This means it must support pairwise authentication with other servers and an au-
thentication server, be able to get a conversation key from the authentication server,
and be able to request that the authentication server decrypt an access certificate.
It may also provide a fast path to avoid the cascaded interface when possible, as
described above. For our example, the generic server must also know to send requests
to a path server.
In order to provide access control, the generic server must have a security policy.
The security policy should be extensible so it can evolve over time and adapt to
different applications. Possible implementations of security policies are discussed in
Section 5.2.4.
A generic server must also provide at least two services. First, it must be able to
create new access certificates when requested. This is required to support cascaded
authentication. Second, it must provide a means for changing the security policy so
it can provide access control that can change over time.
All servers must provide these minimum services. Chapter 5 will describe an
implementation of a generic server and show how other servers, including the domain,
path, and authentication servers may be built from it.
4.5 Summary
This chapter has described the security model that will be used for the Information
Mesh. After exploring the threat model for the Information Mesh and the weaknesses
of the server-based model, we developed the model for the Information Mesh.
The model is founded in the server-based model, but is extended to allow a group
of servers, a domain, to behave like an object. This domain object has the ability to
intercept messages destined for servers in the group it controls and can apply its own
security policy to those messages. This effectively applies a centralized security policy
to messages entering a domain. The model uses a modified version of the cascaded
authentication protocols seen in the previous chapter.
The model presents three types of servers that are required and must be trusted.
A domain server controls the security policy for the domain. An authentication server
is needed to decrypt access certificates and provide conversation keys. As a result of
the difficulty involved in redirecting messages to the appropriate domain servers, a
path server is required to direct a message through the correct path.
Finally, we were able to develop a generic server that provided the interface and
services that all servers must provide. This includes the ability to communicate using
the cascaded authentication protocols and services to provide new access certificates
and modify its security policy.
Chapter 5
A Room Reservation System
In order to fully understand the Information Mesh security model, it is necessary to
look at an extended example of the model. The example will also expose implemen-
tation issues that were not handled as part of the model. This chapter will detail
an implementation of the model that allows principals to reserve conference rooms
around MIT.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the environment and the assumptions on
which the example is built. It then details the implementation of a generic server
which is used as a foundation for all the servers that are discussed: the path server,
domain server, authentication server, room reservation servers, and signature servers.
As each server is described, so will the issues associated with that server. Bootstrap-
ping is a common problem for the servers and will be discussed separately. Finally,
the example world will be built and run.
5.1 Environment
In order to simplify the example, it is necessary to limit the environment and the
threats associated with it. These simplifications will help make the example easier to
understand and implement. The simplifying assumptions will affect the design, but
will still indicate how the security model would behave in a full Information Mesh
environment. This section describes the assumptions about the environment and de-
scribes the room reservation service that has been developed within that environment.
The example is implemented on one host. This includes all the servers, domains,
and clients. All servers are trusted to send service requests to the path server. These
assumptions allow us to avoid the issue of how to redirect messages to the path server.
This would not be appropriate for a full implementation of the security model. We
chose not to address the routing problem in order to focus more clearly on the security
problems.
The example also only uses one authentication server and one path server. Since
we are implementing a fairly small world, more servers are not necessary. It also
speeds examples up by not requiring cascaded authentication requests, beyond the
request that is being processed. These simplifications avoid some confusion while
running examples.
Finally, we will take a moment to discuss how we would like the room reservation
service to work since it will influence the design of the servers that will implement it.
Every room that may be reserved has a server that controls the authoritative list of
reservations for the room. A room reservation server may be the authority for one
or more rooms. It may also know of rooms for which it is not an authority, though it
will know which servers are the authorities for those rooms. Before these authorities
may schedule a reservation, the request must be signed by someone who is considered
"in charge" of the room. This is accomplished by a signature server. It is possible
for one signature server to be in charge of multiple rooms.
5.2 The Generic Server
The generic server embodies all the functionality of a server, except for the specific
services it might provide. It can perform cascaded authentication, work with authen-
tication servers to verify access certificates, and check permissions using the server's
security policy. It implements the required services to provide new access certificates
and allow for modification of the server's security policy.
This section describes the implementation of the generic server. It also discusses
issues related to implementing a security policy that expresses the generality and
flexibility necessary to achieve the goals of the Information Mesh.
The generic server has two encryption keys: a key shared with the authentication
server and a secret key that only it knows (for encrypting the initial access certifi-
cates). The server keeps a policy file that stores its security policy. It also keeps a
list of access certificates it holds in an ac-list.
The generic server has the ability to manage both ends of the unmodified pairwise
authentication protocol, so it can both send and receive requests with other servers.
When sending a request, it first requests a conversation key from an authentication
server. Additionally, it can send requests to authentication servers using the pair-
wise authentication protocol that we modified for communication with authentication
servers.
5.2.1 Processing a Request
When a server receives a request for a service, it must determine if the request passes
its security policy. This section will outline the steps necessary to authenticate a
request. Servers may skip some of these steps as their policy dictates. Here is an
outline for a full authentication of a request:
1. Check security policy to see if the request must be authenticated.
2. If the request must be authenticated, send the access certificate to an authen-
tication server and wait for the reply. This involves:
(a) Get an access certificate for the authentication server.
(b) Sign the access certificate.
(c) Send the original access certificate to the authentication server, along with
the access certificate for the authentication server, and wait for the reply.
3. If the response is positive, apply the security policy, if necessary.
4. If the request passes the security policy, invoke the service.
The server invokes the requested service using arguments provided in message
three of the pairwise authentication (Figure 3-2). If, at any point, the request fails
to pass any of these tests, an error message is returned to the client requesting the
service.
5.2.2 Sending a Request
The process of sending a request can be a bit more complicated than the process
of receiving one. This results from having to keep track of the number of access
certificates the server is holding for a service, so it can get more when it runs out.
Here are the steps required to send a request:
1. Check to see if there is an access certificate for the service in ac-list.
2. If there are no access certificates for that service, we must get some before trying
to send the request. When getting certificates, it is best to get many of them
to reduce the number of get-ac requests.
(a) Save the request in a request-list.
(b) Get some access certificates for the service.
i. Send a request using the service get-ac to get more certificates for
the desired service. This is accomplished by starting at Step 1 with
the service get-ac. This procedure will not recurse because there
must be access certificates for get-ac or else it has encountered a
bootstrapping problem.
ii. If this only leaves one remaining access certificate for get-ac, then use
it to get more access certificates for get-ac.
(c) Remove the request from the request-list and goto step 1. This will
also not recurse because now there is a guarantee that there will be access
certificates available for the service.
3. If the access certificate is in ac-list get it and remove it from the list.
4. If this leaves no more access certificates for the service, get some more (see step
4-b).
5. Sign the access certificate.
6. Send the request using pairwise authentication.
We should note that this process requires the server to hold some get-ac access
certificates initially. This bootstrapping problem will be discuss in Section 5.7.
5.2.3 Generic Services
A generic server provides two services that are required both for cascaded authenti-
cation and to allow the servers to evolve. get-ac allows clients to request new access
certificates and update-policy allows authorized principals to change the server's
security policy.
get-ac requires the following information in order to process the request: (number
destination service). get-ac replies with number access certificates for service.
destination refers to the destination server that is to be encrypted in the access
certificate. destination must correspond to the server that is requesting the access
certificates.
The information necessary for an update-policy request will vary depending
upon the implementation of the security policy. For our security policy (described
below) the necessary information is: (service attribute add? value). service
indicates which service's security policy is being modified. add? indicates whether
the bit associated with attribute should be set high or low. value specifies any
values that may be associated with the attribute in the security policy. Finally, the
attribute all allows policies for services to be added and removed. Specifics about
the security policy and attributes are discussed below.
5.2.4 Security Policies
The representation of its security policy can severely restrict the flexibility and evolv-
ability of the Mesh security model. We would like a representation that allows the
security policy to change over time. Not only should the values of the attributes be
able to change, but which attributes are checked should be allowed to change. For
example, one server may only care about which hosts are trying to access it, while
another may care how many servers have handled the request, how much the client is
willing to spend on the service, and the speed of the client's internet connection. In
the future, attributes we do not consider important now may be checked for access
control purposes.
For the example, we have developed a simple security policy representation. It
has some flexibility about which attributes it checks, but does not evolve well. We
will discuss an idea for a more sophisticated representation later.
The simple security policy has the following form:
(service (authenticate? constraint? security-policy) init-constraints)
Where security-policy and init-constraints (and other constraints) have the
form:
(bit-list value value .. )
Each server has such a policy for every service it provides. These are distinguished
by service. The bits authenticate? and constraint? indicate whether or not it
is necessary to authenticate a request for this service or necessary to check all the
constraints in the access certificate.
The remainder of the security policy and the constraints have a similar form. They
have a set of bits where each bit represents an attribute that can be checked. If the
bit is set high, then the attribute must be checked and any information necessary to
define the policy for that attribute is included as a value. The values are listed in the
order of the bits that are set high. For example, a policy may check four attributes:
The number of servers that may handle the request, the principals that may handle
the request, the price the client is willing to pay for the service, and the time that has
passed since the access certificate was created'. A server may then have the policy:
(1010 (4) ($1))
This policy says that the request may be handled by no more than four servers and
the client must be willing to pay at least one dollar for the service.
This policy representation does not evolve well because it relies on some universal
agreement on the attribute which each bit represents. A solution to this problem may
be suggested by the Hydra [20] capability system. Hydra designed a flexible security
policy based on twenty-four bits. The first sixteen bits represented access control
privileges to a fixed set of general operations. The last eight bits represented type
specific privileges. Those bits represented access control for different operations in
policies of different types.
It may be possible to transfer the idea of different types of policies to the Infor-
mation Mesh. This could be accomplished by making a security policy a first-class
object. This would allow us to define a security-policy-role and different types of
policies would be represented by subroles of the security-policy-role. Each attribute
could be defined as a different action of the role, allowing each subrole to support a
different set of attributes. Every security policy would have to play one of the sub-
roles of the security-policy-role. This and other representations for security policies
are subjects for future research.
5.3 Path Server
A path server is a trusted server that directs a request through the appropriate do-
mains to get to its destination. The path server must keep track of the servers and
domains that exist and must be able to direct the request to each domain for ap-
proval. A path server does not check its security policy for any requests that are not
destined for itself; its job is not to approve requests, just to distribute them to the
1This attribute is easy to verify if a timestamp is used for the nonce in the initial certificate.
servers that do approve requests. For this reason, it is not necessary to get an access
certificate when trying to access a different server through the path server.
The service for directing a message through the domains is called enter-domain.
The service request requires three arguments, (info server service), the informa-
tion necessary to process the request at the destination server and the server and
service for which the request is destined. The access certificate for the destination
service is passed to the path server as normal since no access certificate is required
for the path server.
Once the path server receives such a request, it then contacts all the domain
servers in the path. There domain servers may be contacted sequentially or all at
once. These methods lead to different solutions that can affect the security policies
that are possible. If the request is approved by all the domain servers, then it is
passed on to the destination server.
When contacting the domain servers sequentially, the path server first signs the
access certificate, then passes it (along with any other relevant information) to each
domain server from the most general to the most specific, as discussed above. The
domain server will check the certificate and information against its security policy.
If the request passes, the domain server signs the certificate and returns it to the
path server, otherwise it returns a negative response. This method results in all the
domain servers signing the access certificate in order.
There are several advantages to this method. It allows servers (both domain
and local) to base at least part of their security policies on the approval of a more
general server. It also leaves a distinct audit trail since the signatures on the access
certificate indicate all the servers that have handled it. The method has a very distinct
disadvantage, though. It will be slow, especially if there are several domains in the
path. The many encryptions necessary and the ordering of each approval will add a
long delay for the request to get to its destination.
In the interest of developing a more efficient method to get approval from the
domains, the path server may contact all the domains in the path at the same time.
The path server sends the access certificate and other relevant information to the
domain servers. All it expects in return is an approval or disapproval of the request.
If all the domain servers return a positive response, then the path server signs the
request and passes it to the destination server. If any domain server returns a negative
response, then the request is rejected.
This method is much more efficient than the previous one. It also leaves an audit
trail, only not as explicit as in the previous method. The audit trail can be found by
contacting the path server that signed the access certificate and querying it for the
path that it contacted for approval. This method is limited in that security policies
can not depend upon the response of a more general server.
We have chosen the latter method in the interest of efficiency, but do not limit
other implementations to do the same.
Finally, we must discuss other services that a path server must support. The
server should allow domains and servers to be added and removed. Additionally,
domains need to be allowed to change over time. These services are reflected by
modify-domain and modify-server. It is incumbent upon domains and servers to
tell the path server when they come into existence or when the go away in order to
keep the server current.
modify-domain allows an authorized principal to add, remove, and change do-
mains. The changes are indicated by three arguments: (domain modify victims).
domain indicates the name of the domain that will be affected, while modify indicates
what will be done to domain. modify is a number that tells whether domain is to
be added, removed, or modified. victims is a list that describes which objects will
be under the influence of the domain. It is a list of pairs (name . type) where
name is the name of the victim and type is one of the following: server, domain, or
group. server means that the named victim is a local server, domain that the victim
is another domain, and group means that the victim is a group of servers that can
be named as one, such as: *.mit.edu, *.lcs.mit.edu, 18.26.0.*, etc.
When modify-domain is invoked, it is necessary to compare every server and
domain indexed by the path server against the victim list to see if it is affected. If it
is, then appropriate changes must be made to indicate the change in the domain.
modify-server allows an authorized principal to add or remove a server from
the path server. This requires the request to include (server add?) to name the
server and whether it should be added or removed. Adding a server means that the
path server must check all the domains that it knows about and determine the path
required to get to the new server.
5.4 Domain Server
The domain server is the second trusted server. As we saw above, its purpose is to
apply a domain-wide security policy and inform a path server of the results. A domain
server needs (destination ac info) in order to approve the access certificate. This
provides the name of the destination server, access certificate, and any additional
information needed for judging the request. The domain server uses the tools provided
by a generic server to check the access certificate against its security policy and returns
its approval or disapproval of the request as discussed above.
5.5 Authentication Server
The final trusted server is the authentication server. While it is based on the generic
server, it has some subtle variations that will be discussed here. The authentication
server must perform two services - authenticating access certificates and distributing
conversation keys.
The first variation is a result of distributing conversation keys. There is no need
for pairwise authentication when requesting a conversation key because only authentic
servers will be able to decrypt the response containing the key. This service, therefore,
by-passes the pairwise authentication interface.
The second variation from the generic server is the requirement that the authenti-
cation server must be able to communicate using both sides of the modified pairwise
authentication protocol that was described in Figure 4-2. All its communications will
use this modified protocol. Local and domain servers that trust the authentication
server will share a key with the server. Furthermore, authentication servers that trust
each other must similarly share a pre-negotiated key. Since these groups represent all
the servers that will communicate with the authentication server, only the modified
protocol is needed.
Authentication servers will contact each other for authentication services when
they do not control all the keys necessary to verify an access certificate. They may
only contact other authentication servers that they trust and with whom they share
a key. This communication may require further invocation before the authentication
is complete. These invocations must be accomplished using the modified cascaded
authentication protocol.
The only data needed to authenticate an access certificate is the access certificate
itself. authenticate decrypts one layer of encryption at a time and makes sure that
the certificate was formed properly. If it encounters a signature for which it does not
have a key, it will request help from a different, but trusted, authentication server.
It can not decrypt the initial certificate since it is encrypted with a key that only
the creator knows. It returns this initial certificate to the requesting server to finish
verifying the certificate.
Now that we have described the servers that are required for the security model,
we can now look at the local servers that are specific to the example.
5.6 Local Servers
Reserving conference rooms requires two types of servers: a signature server to grant
official approval for the principal to use a room and a room reservation server that
keeps track of the reservations for a room. It is also necessary to have a client to
request the reservations.
The servers are modeled after the process that is necessary to reserve conference
rooms. To reserve a room, you must go to the person in charge of the room, find
out if the room is free when you need it, and get a signature to approve your use
of the room at that time. The servers are a slight variation on the process. First a
client must receive permission to use a room, then it checks with the server that has
authority over the room to see if the room is available when it is needed. This section
describes these servers and a client.
5.6.1 Signature Server
The signature server has the job of signing a request for a room. If the request
passes the security policy of the signature server, the server then signs the request.
The signature server (as well as the room reservation server) may want to know any
number of details to sign-request. This information should be listed as an extensible
list of attribute-value pairs such as the following:
((cert ac)
(for value)
(contact value)
(reply value)
(room value)
(time (day, starttime, length))
(period value)
(number value)
(cost value)
access certificate for reservation service
group for which the room is being reservered
who to contact about the request
where to send replies
which room is being reserved
when the room is needed
periodic use of the room:
value is onetime, daily, weekly, monthly
number of people the room needs to accommodate
amount the group is willing to pay to
reserve the room
The signature server signs ac and replaces it in the list. It then passes the request
on to the appropriate reservation server. If the request does not pass the security
policy of the server, then an error is returned to the client.
5.6.2 Room Reservation Server
The room reservation server is responsible for scheduling the use of one or more
rooms. It must keep track of the use of each room for which it is the authority and
make sure there are no scheduling conflicts. It may know about rooms for which it
is not the authority. It will pass such requests to the appropriate signature server for
further processing.
In order to reserve a room, the room reservation server needs the same list of
information that was used to access the signature server. It is likely that its security
policy will require that the access certificate be signed by a particular signature server,
though this may not be the case for all rooms. In all cases, the room must be unused
for the entire time requested.
Additional functionality may be added to the room reservation server. If the server
is given some knowledge of characteristics of each room, it would be possible for the
reservation server to suggest rooms when a room is not specified in the information
list. For example, if the server knows about the seating capacity of each room,
it could suggest a room based on the number of people that will be using it. It
could include other characteristics such as the presence of audio/visual equipment,
conference tables, whiteboard space, etc.
5.6.3 Client
A client has much of the same functionality as the generic server. While it must be
able to send cascaded requests, it does not need to be able to receive the requests.
It must also have the added functionality of being able to initiate a request for a
particular service or set of services. This involves collecting the necessary information
to initiate the request (along with an access certificate) and sending it via the pairwise
authentication protocols.
5.7 Bootstrapping
This model requires that a server must have an access certificate to get more access
certificates. This implies that a server must be primed with some access certificates
before it may function in its environment. This section details what information is
required to solve this bootstrapping problem and a way that it may be achieved.
Before a server or client can use a service, it must have an access certificate for
that service. To get the access certificate, the server needs an access certificate for
get-ac. This implies that a server needs access certificates for get-ac for every server
with which it ever wants to communicate.
While this may be possible to create by hand in the little world of our example,
it does not scale to a real system. In the real world, there will likely be services that
trade access certificates. They could provide get-ac and other access certificates
for large numbers of servers and services. A new server would then only need to be
primed with a few access certificates, including at least one trading service. It would
then have access to certificates for nearly any service that it wanted.
5.8 The Example
We have used the servers described above to create an example of the Mesh security
model in action. This section describes our example world and some tests and their
results that have been performed on this world. We also use the example to illustrate
where bottlenecks may occur in the system and possible solutions to them.
5.8.1 A Miniature World
Our example world uses the servers described above to implement a small room
reservation service around MIT. There is one path server and one authentication
server for the entire world to simplify the problem. Figure 5-1 shows all the servers
and domains in the example world.
The example world presents five hierarchical domains. The Laboratory for Com-
puter Science (LCS) and Research Laboratory for Electronics (RLE) domains fall
under the control of the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sci-
ence (EECS). EECS and the Department of Mechanical Engineering (MechE) both
fall under the jurisdiction of the MIT domain. These hierarchical domains are for
demonstration purposes only and do not reflect the actual control structure within
MIT.
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Within each domain are the room reservation servers and their associated signa-
ture servers (See Figure 5-1). The room reservation server for rooms 26-100 and 6-120
know about the rooms 3-133, 34-101, and NE43-518 and vice versa. Additionally, the
room reservation server for 34-101 knows about room 36-839 and NE43-518 (and vice
versa).
The room reservation servers have a policy of not accepting any reserve requests
unless they have been signed by their associated signature servers. The MIT domain
server has a policy of not accepting any domain requests that originate outside of
* .mit. edu. While the ability exists to change these policies, they should not be
modified. All other policies are subject to change for demonstration and testing
purposes.
5.8.2 Tests and Results
Although this example was mainly built to expose issues surrounding the Information
Mesh's security model, we can still use it to run some informative tests. First, the
example is a proof of concept. By using it, we can prove the validity of the model.
Second, although the implementation was not designed for speed or efficiency, we can
run some tests that will expose where the model imposes most of its overhead. This
information will aid us in determining where bottlenecks may occur.
There is not much that can be said about how these tests demonstrate the validity
of the model. All the following tests prove that the model works within the assump-
tions we made at the beginning of this chapter. All the security policies and path
information were set up by running the demonstration. Many other tests have been
made to show that the model enforces its security policies, the path server directs
requests along the appropriate paths, and that cascaded requests cascade correctly.
There are several timing tests that we would like to run. We would like to know
the overhead caused by: getting a conversation key, authenticating an access certifi-
cate (and how much overhead each signature adds to this process), getting approval
from a domain, getting approval from multiple domains, and getting new access cer-
tificates when making a request. Since the actual times will vary greatly with different
implementations, we will look at relative data. All results represent the average of
at least five runs of each test started when the load on the host was at or near zero.
The methods used to arrive at the numbers will be described with each test. While
these numbers may also change with different implementations, they are much more
informative than actual times.
Getting a conversation key
Unless the time it takes to get a conversation key is very large, this time is not very
significant per-request, since it will be amortized over many requests. Where it may
be significant is determining if it will contribute to the authentication server being a
bottleneck to the system. For this test, we will measure the time that it takes to get
the conversation key and compare it to the time it takes the client to send a request
to the path server.
Getting the conversation key was only responsible for approximately 20% of the
time needed to make the request. The majority of the time (approximately 80%) was
spent on signing the request and the pairwise authentication. The results of this test
were very consistent with each running of the test. These numbers should shift even
more heavily towards the signing and authentication as the access certificate gets
larger and the encryption takes longer. So we can see that getting the conversation
key does not contribute much overhead.
Authenticating an access certificate
Another action that may cause the authentication server to be a bottleneck and will
slow a request is the verification of an access certificate. The time this process takes
will vary with the number of signatures on the certificate. We would like to know
what fraction of a simple request is a result of verifying the access certificate and how
much time additional signatures add to the verification.
We will test these by timing how long it takes to verify certificates that have four
and five signatures on them. They can be represented by the following requests: a
request for the MIT domain server to update its policy and a request to reserve room
26-100 when the client asks the MIT signature server.
Verifying the access certificate with four signatures required only an additional
10% in time over the benchmark described below. Verifying a certificate with a fifth
signature on it took about four and a half times longer than verifying the certificate
with four signatures. This result is a bit suspect. Part of the discrepancy is due
to the additional load placed on the host running the servers by adding the server
necessary for the fifth encryption. There may also be an efficiency problem with our
representation of the encrypted string, which causes its length, and hence time needed
for decryption, to grow faster than necessary. While the additional signature should
add some time in the verification of the access certificate, it should not add as much
as our tests show.
Getting approval from domains
Another task which we expect to add time to a request is getting the approval of the
domains in a path. We would like to compare the time it takes to approve a request
through a domain with the time it takes without a domain. First, we will ask the
MIT domain server to update its policy. This request will not need the approval of
any domains and can be used as a benchmark. This test will be compared to a similar
request to the MIT signature server which only needs the approval of the MIT domain
server. Results show that the latter test takes approximately 30% longer than the
benchmark.
We can postulate that asking for the approval of multiple domains in parallel will
speed up the approval time. Unfortunately, our environment does not allow us to test
this appropriately. Since all the servers are running on one host, the parallel requests
must be processed serially. Furthermore, the numerous requests increase the load on
the machine, slowing down the results. For example, a policy update request for the
LCS signature server must get the approval of three domains: the MIT, EECS, and
LCS domains. This test takes approximately 110% longer than the benchmark.
Getting new access certificates
Our final test is to see how much time getting more access certificates adds to the
processing of a request. As with the time for getting a conversation key, this expense
will be amortized over many requests since the request asks for multiple certificates
at once. For this test, the client will be making requests to update the MIT domain's
security policy so no domain approval is necessary. We will compare the running
times of the request to update the policy and of that request coupled with a request
for ten additional access certificates for the service.
The request that was coupled with getting more access certificates took approxi-
mately twice the time of the request that did not require additional access certificates.
This is to be expected, since getting more access certificates during a service request
adds a second full request to the one necessary for the service request.
5.8.3 Bottlenecks
We can imagine that three types of servers might become bottlenecks in a real im-
plementation of the Mesh security model: the authentication server, the path server,
and the domain servers. This section will briefly examine where the bottlenecks may
occur and possible means for alleviating them.
The authentication server may become a bottleneck if it serves too many servers
or if a high percentage of the requests must be authenticated. In either case, the
authentication server may have more requests for verifying access certificates than it
can reasonable handle. As we discovered above, getting conversation keys will not
contribute much to a bottleneck.
One solution would be to reduce the granularity of the authentication server.
There would be more authentication servers serving fewer servers, each with a re-
duced load. This would work well if there is not much communication between the
groups of servers served by each of the new authentication servers. If there is much
communication between the groups then the authentication servers would often need
help from each other to verify access certificates. This would probably negate the
value of reducing the granularity of the authentication server. A second solution
would be to replicate the authentication server.
Domain servers for large domains may also become a bottleneck since they are
the only entrance point to their domains. We may also solve this bottleneck using
either replication or distribution. Replication would allow many access points to
all servers. It has a couple of drawbacks, though. First, it is necessary to have a
means of keeping their security policies consistent. Second, we must have a means for
servers, or protocols, to choose the domain server where they will send their request.
Distribution, on the other hand, provides different access points for different servers.
Each domain server for a single domain would allow access to different servers within
that domain. Now we only have the problem of determining to which domain server
a particular request must be directed.
The final possible bottleneck is a relic of our assumptions for the example, the
path server. Since the path server services all requests for a set of domains, it can be
more of a bottleneck than the domain servers. This bottleneck could also be relieved
using either replication or distribution. Since the path server should not be part of a
real implementation, the possibilities do not need to be discussed here.
These represent all the possible bottlenecks that may be imposed by the Mesh
security model. Other bottlenecks may result from particular local services, such as a
signature server that must sign requests for numerous room reservation servers, but
are not a concern for this discussion.
5.9 Summary
In this chapter, we have seen an implementation of the Mesh security model. It made
several assumptions about its environment to simplify some problems. Most notably,
it trusted all servers to send requests to a path server. We used the implementation
to develop an example room reservation service.
Within this environment, we were able to develop several servers based on a generic
server. These included the authentication server, path server, domain servers, a client,
and two servers needed for the room reservation service: a signature server and a
room reservation server. In order to implement these servers, we needed to develop a
representation for security policies.
Finally, we looked at a room reservation system in action. We developed a small
world of servers around MIT that could sign requests and reserve rooms. This example
was a proof of concept and allowed us to run some tests to help us determine where
bottlenecks may occur in a real implementation. Finally, we looked at possible means
of opening up these bottlenecks.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
We conclude this paper with a brief summary of the ideas that have been presented
and a review of further research that must be done before the Mesh security model
is feasible.
We started by discussing the Information Mesh project and its goals to give us an
understanding of the environment for which we needed a security model. Our model
needed to support the Information Mesh's goals, including flexibility and evolvability,
while providing a uniform model for all servers. The Information Mesh also uses an
object model, with which the security model had to comply.
We then discussed two previous works which we could use as a foundation for the
Mesh security model. The first was cascaded authentication. Cascaded authentication
provided us with the protocols needed to allow a server to authenticate the entire
chain of a cascaded request. It brought up the need for an access certificate which
every server that handles a request must sign. Cascaded authentication provided the
authentication for the security model.
The second work proposed a model where every server controlled its own security
policy, although its default policy may be to query a central policy server for advice.
While this model conforms to the object model, it has the problem that it requires all
the servers in a policy domain to be trusted to implement the correct security policy.
It also has the potential for inconsistencies to develop when updating a policy that
involves many servers.
We wanted to expand this server-based model so that it provided the option for
centralized policy control, while allowing objects to control their own policies. This
was accomplished by allowing groups of servers to behave as a single object, while
still retaining their identity as an object. This domain object would intercept all
messages destined for servers under its control, apply its own security policy, then
pass the request on to its destination if it passes the security check.
This model requires three types of trusted servers. An authentication server is
necessary to verify the access certificates needed for cascaded authentication. It also
must provide conversation keys so servers may perform a pairwise authentication
with each other as part of the cascaded authentication protocol. A domain server
is necessary to enforce a domain's security policy. Finally, the lack of a protocol to
allow domains to intercept incoming requests made it necessary to develop a path
server. The path server directs messages to the appropriate domain servers before
they are passed on to their destinations.
Using this model, we were able to develop a generic server that could perform
all the actions required of a server. It communicated with other servers using the
cascaded authentication protocol and with the authentication server using a modified
version of the protocol. The generic server also provided two forms of generic ser-
vices: providing new access certificates for services and allowing authorized principals
to update its security policies. One problem that was encountered when developing
the generic server was finding an appropriate representation for the security policy.
A solution was given, but further work must be done to find an appropriate repre-
sentation.
At this point, we were ready to build an example implementation of the model.
The example provided services for reserving conference rooms around MIT. In order
to simplify the implementation of the example, we assumed that all servers could be
trusted to send requests to the path server instead of to the destination of the request.
The generic server was used to implement the path and domain servers. Some
minor modifications to the generic server were necessary to use it to implement the
authentication server. The generic server was also used as a foundation for the signa-
ture and room reservation servers that were necessary to provide the room reservation
services in the example. Finally, a client to invoke all the services was implemented
using the generic server. The implementation of these servers uncovered a bootstrap-
ping problem that is inherent in cascaded authentication - the need to have some
initial access certificates to get the process started.
Finally, we were able to run the example and run some tests that allowed us to
recognize some potential bottlenecks in the model. They basically occurred at each
of the three required servers. Each bottleneck could potentially be solved using either
replication or distribution, though they will have different consequences in different
situations.
6.1 Further Research
In developing the model and the example implementation, we discussed two ideas
that require further research. First, protocols need to be developed that will allow
messages to be redirected to the appropriate domain servers. Second, a flexible,
evolvable representation for a security policy must be designed.
A protocol allowing domains to intercept requests is necessary before this security
model can truly be implemented. The protocol must be secure against attackers, such
as unauthorized domains, trying to redirect requests. It must be able to guarantee
that the messages will always be redirected appropriately. The protocol must also be
efficient. It will not be acceptable if it adds much overhead to a request, especially
a request that does not require any authentication. Additionally, any effects the
protocol may have on the model presented here must be explored. This research
must be completed before the model will be valid.
An appropriate representation for security policies must also be developed. In
order to meet the Information Mesh's goals of an infrastructure that is flexible and
evolvable, it is necessary to design a policy representation that also adheres to these
goals. A possible solution, as suggested in Section 5.2.4, is to make the security policy
a first-class object and use the Information Mesh's object model to specify different
types of policies. By allowing different types of policies to be specified, the security
policies can evolve as needed. This solution and others should be investigated to find
an appropriate representation for security policies.
6.2 Conclusion
The security model presented in this paper has much potential as a security model
for the Information Mesh and other systems requiring a model that conforms to an
object-based infrastructure. Its flexible mix of centralized and local policy control
give it the power to implement complex security policies. Future work on security
policy representations will allow these security policies to be modified for different
applications and evolve as required.
Currently, its major flaw is the lack of a protocol to redirect messages to the
domain servers. Once a solution is devised for this flaw, the model will be valid.
This will eliminate the need for both the path servers and the trust in all servers to
send their request to the path servers. The overhead incurred by contacting the path
server will also be eliminated.
In conclusion, once this protocol problem has been resolved, a full scale imple-
mentation is needed to demonstrate the model and the ideas presented in this paper.
It will have to consider the trade-offs between using public and private keys and de-
termine the appropriate ways to relieve bottlenecks for the environment which it is
built. The answers to these questions will vary between different systems and different
domains.
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